The last week in Afghanistan was meant to be one of milestones: the Afghans were taking the lead on security, the Taliban were opening an office in Qatar, and the US and Afghan governments were ready to begin official peace negotiations with Taliban insurgents.
Some of that went according to plan: the security transition did take place as planned, and the office was opened on schedule. But the fate of peace negotiations is now very much in doubt, after the Taliban designated their office as representing the “Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan,” the Taliban name for Afghanistan from 1996 through 2001.
In response, President Karzai called off Afghan involvement in peace negotiations as well as ceasing negotiations with the United States for the Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA), a critical document that would allow for the presence of foreign troops in Afghanistan post-2014.[1]
During the daily State Department press briefing on the 19 June, this was discussed at length,[2] as reporters questioned department spokesperson Jen Psaki about what happened, what it meant for negotiations, and what would likely happen next.
The following are five key takeaways from that briefing and the future of the peace process in Doha.
Without a ceasefire agreement, there can be no peace settlement: Psaki was asked whether the deaths of four American soldiers during a Taliban attack on Bagram air base[3] the day before would affect the peace process in any way.
However, that same day, ISAF and Afghan forces actively engaged the insurgents, continuing to kill and capture what they term “enemies of Afghanistan” in the course of normal operations.[4] Until an active ceasefire is in place, it is impossible to expect any real progress in negotiating an enduring peace agreement.
Pakistani and Indian interests are critical: Any settlement with the Taliban must involve both Pakistan and India: the former due to proximity and the presence of an active insurgency within its borders, and the latter in order to access the potential for future engagement in Afghanistan.
Afghan agreements with either country individually are likely to cause conflict in the region, but a US brokered deal involving all three countries has a chance for sustainability. The Pakistanis are already taking credit for encouraging these talks,[5] an indication of their official position, and a clear sign that they are interested in these talks taking place.
Karzai has traveled to India regularly, particularly in recent years, and while he may not have gotten everything he wanted during his last visit there,[6] that relationship will need to be fostered going forward.
The State Department will not acknowledge multiple Afghan actors at this stage: When asked what the phrases “Afghan-led” and “Afghan-owned” meant in terms of which Afghans were involved, Psaki’s response was abrupt: “Well, I think you know, the Afghans.” There is still some sentiment in Washington for former Northern Alliance partners, but not necessarily in the White House.
These former US partners are now maneuvering to establish their own political futures, and have regularly made clear their belief that they are being sidelined by the US in these and other negotiations.[7] Of course Afghans will be at the table, but what is clear here is that the US has no intention of allowing anyone (at this stage) other than the Karzai government to have a seat at that table.
No meetings this week between the US and the Taliban in Doha: This is a shift, as the special representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan James F. Dobbins had reportedly planned to meet with the Taliban this week, separate from talks involving the Afghan government.[8]
Outside of Karzai’s objections to the Islamic Emirate labeling of the Taliban office, Kabul has never been comfortable with the idea of US negotiations separate from the Afghan government. Kerry and Dobbins will still be traveling in the region this week, but their itinerary has been drastically altered. So it appears that Karzai’s latest (justified) objections to US actions in Afghanistan have caused at least a temporary shift in US plans for Taliban talks.
There are two competing agendas in talks with the Taliban: Psaki made that very clear, particularly here:
The U.S. has a separate interest, our own stake and our own interests, which I just talked about, including them denouncing terrorism, including some of the issues with Sergeant Bergdahl as well, which we will discuss. But in terms of the reconciliation process, that is a process – Afghans between Afghans. That’s – that hasn’t changed from yesterday to today to a month ago and longer.
This opens the door for speculation that the US is working toward a post-Karzai solution to the Taliban problem. If the US in 2013 is officially viewing their interests where the Taliban are concerned as divergent from Kabul’s interests, this means the US has no intention of taking the lead from Karzai when it comes to talks with insurgents.
However, Karzai’s trump card in all of this is the BSA, and that’s why it was raised in conjunction with his objections to the Taliban designation for the Doha office.
The concern for Afghans is how invested the United States will be in the country post-2014. Until now the US has been resolute in affirming commitment to the people of Afghanistan on a long-term basis.
But American interests in the region are increasingly focused on 2016 and the next presidential election, and less focused on the fate of a foreign nation that appears to American voters to be a less-than-solid investment. What is clear is that the Obama administration is comfortable with looking out for American interests first, and Afghan interests second, but only if those interests coincide.
While Karzai’s suspension of security agreement negotiations is justifiable — he is the duly elected leader of a sovereign nation with an insurgent problem after all – he runs a real risk of the US executing the Iraq withdrawal model. This was less problematic for Iraq, since, for all its internal sectarian conflicts, that country was at least able to support itself to some extent.
Afghanistan does not have that capability, and will not for years to come. Such a withdrawal may not serve all US interests in the region, but Pakistan has proven itself an engaged (if problematic) partner in continuing to prosecute the war on terror, so there are alternatives to basing troops in Afghanistan. While Doha may not mean lasting peace, it could mean lasting regret for a president who may have stood up for himself and his country once too often.